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Introduction and Preliminary Considerations 
 
How are we conscious of our auditory sensations and perceptions?  
Recent philosophical theories of sound and auditory perception tend to focus on 
various aspects of sound itself; e.g. (1) the ontology of sounds, or whether sounds are 
secondary qualities, waves, or some type of event, (2) the mere content of auditory 
experience, or what sorts of properties we perceive and how sounds are individuated in 
virtue of their temporal patterns and spatial locations, and (3) the sources and specific 
location of sounds.1  But these theories are limited only to questions regarding how we 
become aware of the physical sound conceived, for example, as a property of an object 
(Pasnau, 1999), an object-like (Nudds, 2001), an event-like individual (Casati and 
Dokic, 1994; O’Callaghan, 2007, 2009), a pure event detached from its physical causes 
(Scruton, 1997), or as a stable property (Kulvicki, 2008).   
Although the contribution of these accounts has been extremely significant for 
the development of a philosophy of sounds and audition, none tackle the specific 
question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises.  Here I propose an 
account of auditory consciousness, which includes both an account of the qualitative 
character of auditory states and how those states become conscious.  This account 
aligns with extant theories (a kind of perceptual-role theory and a metacognitive theory 
of consciousness) which have been independently motivated, and also extends those 
theories by advancing proposals specific to this neglected but important domain. 
One motivation for this inquiry is that auditory states have a puzzling nature, 
which sets audition apart from other modalities.  As opposed to ordinary tangible, static, 
or material objects which are generally grasped through vision or touch, auditory states 
have to do with particulars that occur or change along with time, and thus qua auditory 
states they are constitutively temporal, or exhibit temporality when those extended 
particulars or phenomena such as change, succession, and persistence occur.   
Auditory states also entail momentary experiences, variations, anticipations and 
predictions, and comprise retention of recent past events.  Yet even though auditory 
states might seem at first sight to be too elusive and complex to be examined, they are 
nevertheless significant for the study of consciousness.  Specifically, being conscious of 
our auditory states as opposed to being conscious of a merely particular, object, or 
auditory feature is necessary for the study of our mental lives—it is meaningful not only 
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 For a discussion on the ontology and sources of sounds: Pasnau (1999); Casati and Dokic (1994); 
Dokic (2007); Hamilton (2009).  I overlook the problem of auditory hallucinations, auditory illusions, and 
any reference to ‘auditory objects’ in recent definitions of sounds: O’Callaghan (2008); O'Callaghan and 
Nudds (2009). 
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for our subjective experiences per se, but also for what we process while thinking about 
those very experiences.2   
The prevalent theories of consciousness, on the other hand, tend not to discuss 
in detail the auditory modality involved in our experiences.  In contrast to the vast 
research regarding visual states, auditory states had been constantly neglected in the 
philosophical literature on consciousness.   
One might inquire what kind of auditory particulars is being engaged in the 
auditory experience that I investigate here.  Unquestionably, there is a difference 
between our having an auditory experience of complex sounds vs. our having such an 
experience of less complex or simple sounds.  Although different audible features such 
as pitch, timbre, loudness, and spatial location can be similarly processed by listening to 
a speech, a lions’ growling, a horn, a yell, an automobile tires’ screeching, clicks, 
percussive noises, or a musical piece, there is a peculiar distinction between hearing at 
this time the sound of a yell or a simple click, vs. hearing through time—and at the same 
time—changes, successions, variations, and repetitions of musical sounds.  Given that 
musical sounds are inherently defined as complex relationships determined by length 
and width—thus discerning and defining them are challenging enough—, I concentrate 
on analyzing the auditory experience of them.  
My aim is to explain how audition goes from being not conscious to being 
conscious; in other words, how our consciousness of auditory states arises.  That is, 
what is it for a subject to be conscious of her auditory states with particular qualitative 
distinctions?  In searching for an answer to this question, I examine a range of auditory 
mental phenomena (pitch, timbre, loudness, and spatial location) with their particular 
properties.  I argue that we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of our auditory 
sensations and to be conscious of our auditory states with specific distinctions while 
having an auditory experience.   
To develop an approach to auditory experience, it is helpful to build on 
approaches to consciousness that have already been independently motivated in the 
literature.  Here, I draw on David Rosenthal’s high-order-thought (HOT) theory of 
consciousness plus his quality-space theory (QST) of mental qualities (2005; 2010).3   
I will argue that these theories lend themselves to audition, and their successful 
application there, provides further support for their explanatory adequacy.  QST is 
intended to explain how we discriminate among perceptible properties that figure in 
qualitative experience by locating those properties in a quality space.  The HOT theory 
offers an explanation of how we are aware of conscious qualitative states.4  
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 I overlook the debate on ‘inverted spectrum’—i.e. whether two subjects being physically alike are 
different in terms of what it is like for them to have certain conscious states—and ‘zombies’—i.e., whether 
these creatures have conscious states or not.  
3
 Mental qualities are ‘the properties of perceptions in virtue of which an individual can discriminate 
among the relevant perceptible properties’ (Rosenthal, 2010: 378).  Rosenthal does not call mental 
qualities ‘qualia’, because on his view they are not necessarily conscious— they might be conscious and 
they might not be.  However, qualia are defined as ‘properties of conscious experiences [or states] in 
virtue of which there is something it is like to have experiences’ (Mandik, 2010: 97) or to have a distinctive 
‘feel’ (Nagel, 1974).  
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Qualitative states ‘are those mental states in virtue of which we respond mentally to the properties of 
environmental objects and processes’ (Rosenthal, 2005: 177).  Here I address sensations and 
perceptions.  ‘A sensation is a ‘preconceptual conscious state that figures among the raw materials out of 
which a perception may be formed… (Mandik 2010: 108–9). 
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This project takes advantage of the particular merits of both the HOT theory of 
consciousness and the QST of mental qualities. I show that the HOT theory, 
supplemented by the QST, can be profitably employed for the auditory modality.  
Specifically with respect to the qualitative character of sounds, and to the way we 
understand the consciousness of auditory sensations with their respective qualitative 
distinctions.   
No one has shown the applicability of these theories in tandem to the auditory 
modality. Rosenthal does not analyze how specifically auditory states with their auditory 
qualities work within his account, and proponents of HOT and QST have not discussed 
the auditory case in depth.  Moreover, specific details about how this domain works 
cannot be trivially inferred from HOT or QST.  Here, I will offer specific proposals about 
the qualities of pitch, timbre, loudness, and spatial location for complex sounds.  These 
extend well beyond what is presented in work on HOT and QST, and some of my 
proposals could be adapted to fit with other theories of consciousness as well.  
The consequence of making use of Rosenthal's theories in this respect is, not 
only the expansion of Rosenthal's theories (as I show at §§2-3)—, but also a 
supplement to existing philosophical theories of auditory perception; in particular, to the 
individuation of auditory experiences according to the way we perceive audible features, 
and the way we create quality-spaces for our auditory states. 
In order to analyze how our consciousness of auditory states arises, my strategy 
is to use QST to show how we can discriminate among an array of similarities and 
differences of mental qualities such as pitch, timbre, loudness, and spatial location.  I 
further take HOT theory to explain what it’s like to be in auditory states with those 
particular qualitative distinctions.  After discussing how we become conscious of 
auditory states with those qualities, I show how acquiring experience and conceptual 
resources for the qualities of our auditory sensations might affect the way we become 
conscious of auditory sensations with fine-grained qualities.  In order to show the 
supplemented theory at work, I close by observing how a hypothetical experienced 
listener in possession of a refined musical conceptual vocabulary may describe and 
report her higher-order-thoughts about her musical experience.  
The paper is divided into three sections: I begin by pointing out some of the 
basics of HOT and QS theories (§1).  After that, I will argue for my own proposals to 
show how the QST of mental qualities works for the musical subset of the auditory 
modality (§2).  Finally, I will show how one’s higher-order-thoughts capture qualitative 
distinctions of auditory sensations, and what factors might contribute to one’s 
consciousness of auditory states while having a musical experience (§3). 
 
1. Higher-Order-Thoughts and Quality-Space 
 
HOT theory maintains that qualitative states sometimes occur without their being 
conscious, as is the case of subliminal perception—i.e., when a stimulus is undetected 
or just perceived below the threshold of consciousness, but the stimulus still implies a 
sensory response (Rosenthal, 2005: 177–179).   
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HOT theory further claims that although we might be conscious of something (a 
merely particular, object, or event) by sensing it—i.e. by having first-order states5—, we 
do not become conscious of our qualitative state just by sensing.  We require a further 
thought that makes us aware of being in that sensing state—a higher-order state.  So, 
having a higher-order-thought is the way of being conscious of ourselves as being in 
that state.6  This is a combination of transitive consciousness or being conscious of 
something as being present and state consciousness or that state itself being 
conscious.  Thus, a state is conscious if one is conscious of that state in some suitable 
way—that is, by having a thought about oneself having the experience in question 
(Rosenthal, 1997: 741; 2004: 18–22; 2005: 182–5).7   
So, what it is like for us to be in a distinctive qualitative state depends on how we 
are conscious of that state.  However, in order to explain conscious of being in a 
qualitative state, and to describe that state in terms of corresponding qualities, a kind of 
perceptual-role theory that accounts for the mental qualities that that state exhibits is 
necessary.  Hence, I appeal to Quality-Space Theory.  
QST discusses the qualitative character of our mental states and accounts for a 
way in which we are able to discriminate among an array of mental qualities for any 
sensory modality (Clark, 1993; 2000; Rosenthal, 2005; 2010).  Indeed, QST gives an 
account of mental qualities that is independent of those qualities we can access by 
consciousness (Rosenthal 2010: 373–76).  
In order to account for mental qualities per se, this theory builds on the quality-
space of discriminable perceptible properties—rather than on physical properties of the 
stimuli.  So the distinction between physical properties or characteristics accessible by 
perception and the corresponding mental qualities is relevant.8  That is, in the first 
instance, we discern similarities and differences among the perceptible properties of 
any sensory modality, and thus we construct a quality-space of those properties based 
on ‘just noticeable differences’ and in respect of their location, position, or on ‘how 
distant each property is from every other’ property (Rosenthal, 2005: 198–222; 2010: 
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 Rosenthal argues against first-order theories such as Dretske’s (1997), which posit that a state is 
conscious if it simply makes one conscious of something; such theories arguably cannot explain non-
conscious mental states.  
6
 At this point the theories of Carruthers (2000) and Rosenthal (1997; 2005) differ.  While Carruthers 
stresses that in order for a mental state to be conscious, it is necessary to have a disposition to be the 
object of such a higher-order representation, Rosenthal stresses that the importance of the higher-order 
representation to occur involves actually being the target of a higher-order representation.   
7
 For criticism to HOT: (a) the targetless problem: Byrne, 1997: 103–29; Levine, 2001; Block, 2009; 2011; 
(b) the cognitive overload problem: Carruthers, 2000: 221–22; (c) the richness problem: Block, 2011.  For 
responses to criticism: (a) the dental-fear case: Rosenthal, 2005: 127, 172, 209–11; 2010; 2011; 
Weisberg, 2011; (b) the cocktail-party effect: Rosenthal, 2005:111 fn. 10:128; at §3 I show that auditory 
higher-order-thoughts are not isolated but rather come in clusters; (c) at §3 I show that HOT theory in 
tandem with QST allows for highly detailed discriminations of our auditory experiences by use of 
comparative thoughts.  For empirical support of HOT theories: Lau and Rosenthal (2011), Lau and Brown 
(forthcoming), Brown (2012).  For reasons of space I omit this discussion.   
8
 For a discussion on this distinction see Rosenthal, 2010: 379.  For specific distinctions between 
auditory-property and auditory-quality see my §2.  For a discussion on third-person/fist-person perception, 
‘quality inversion’, ‘zombies’, ‘explanatory gap’, and ‘hard problem’: Rosenthal 2010: 368–72; 380–81; my 
fn.2. 
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377–80).9  Derivatively from that process, the quality-space ascertains the 
discrimination of the corresponding mental qualities.10   
It is worthwhile emphasizing that ‘location’ according to the quality-space theory 
does not refer to the spatial location of the physical properties or characteristics; it refers 
only to the properties with respect to the way we distinguish among them.  
 
 
2.  Auditory Quality-Space  
 
With these two preliminary views explained, I can now fill in the details of how we 
can create an auditory quality-space.  In this section, I argue that QST lends itself to 
audition, and its successful application here, provides further support for its explanatory 
adequacy.  I show that QST offers a useful platform for the qualitative character of 
sounds, and in capturing the scope of fine-grained differences among them.  I further 
show that QST allow us to map similarities and differences among, in the first instance, 
noticeable audible properties, (also called) acoustic or physical properties, such as the 
rate of sound vibration, the quality of sound that distinguishes one instrument from 
another, and the level of strength or energy of sound vibrations (in simple terms these 
can be identified, respectively, as frequency, tone-color, and amplitude); and 
derivatively from that mapping, the corresponding mental qualities of pitch, timbre, and 
loudness.11   
It is important to see that sounds have at least frequency, tone-color, and 
amplitude independent of being perceived.  For simplicity’s sake, I will write the audible 
physical property of the rate of sound vibration (or frequency) as ‘pitchp’, and the 
perceived characteristic or its related mental quality as ‘pitchm’—i.e. the quality of 
“highness” or “lowness” of sound that we perceive—, and do the same for timbre and 
loudness.  Notice how, in my discussion, I keep the distinction between physical 
properties and mental qualities. 
First, if we accept that QST can be employed profitably for the auditory modality, 
we might say that auditory mental qualities are the properties of auditory sensations in 
virtue of which we are able to discern among the range of audible properties of sounds.  
QST would allow us to map similarities and differences among, in the first instance, 
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 According to Rosenthal (2010: 378), ‘the distance between any two perceptible properties is a function 
of how many properties between the two the creature can discriminate’.   
10
 For objections to QST see the experiential holism problem—e.g., ganzfeld, diachromatic and color 
agnosic cases: Prinz 2012: 131–132.  QST advocates might response: since the core of our 
discriminative ability is to grasp perceptual differences among distinct types of stimulus, and since 
ganzfeld is a phenomenon of perceptual deprivation of the stimulus, and no comparative component is at 
stake in diachromatic and color agnosic cases, the previous objection does not mean a serious challenge 
for QST.  For reasons of space I omit this discussion.   
11
 Pitch, timbre, and loudness are identified as audible features in the philosophical literature on sounds 
(O’Callaghan, 2008).  In the literature on music, these are called properties of sounds (Randel, 1986; 
Kerman, 2008).  I use ‘audible properties’ as equivalent to ‘perceptible properties’, in Rosenthal’s terms.  I 
reserve ‘quality’ for ‘mental quality’, ‘auditory mental quality’ or the psychological dimension.  Neither the 
use of ‘property’ nor ‘quality’ here is an attempt to equate them with Locke’s notions of ‘sounds as 
properties of the bodies’, nor of ‘sensible qualities possessed by bodies’.  Nor do I address the 
controversy among property, wave, and event views (O’Callaghan, 2007; 2009; Kulvicki, 2008).  
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noticeable distinct ‘pitchesp’, and derivatively from that map their corresponding 
‘pitchesm’.  
How, specifically, would QST account for the qualitative character of sounds and 
their fine-grained differences? Rosenthal (2005: 198) points out that ‘the ways the 
various mental qualities resemble and differ from one another are homomorphic to the 
ways the corresponding perceptible properties of… events resemble and differ. A 
sensation of the sound of a trumpet, for example, resembles a sensation of the sound of 
a woodwind more than it does a sensation of the sound of a violin.’  
Since he does not elaborate on audition, I infer (A) that Rosenthal conceives of 
sounds as events of a certain kind; and (B) that the resemblance and difference among 
audible properties is where we should look to individuate the qualitative character of 
sounds.  If (A) is correct, we should take it that sounds are events that occur over time.  
They are concrete individuals with durations: a beginning, middle, and an end, which 
can therefore be located in space and time.12  If (B) is correct, it is necessary to explain 
what exactly we can discriminate of the qualitative character of a sound.  We can, at the 
very least, discriminate between timbres, pitches, and varying degrees of loudness, for 
example.  
To expand: as is well-known, sound events can be classified according to the 
several properties we can perceive, such as pitch, timbre, and loudness.  These are the 
sorts of properties that allow us to classify sounds as being of a certain type.  Our 
auditory quality-space would have then at least three dimensions: we can discriminate 
among pitchesm, timbresm, and loudnessm.  It is important to observe that the auditory 
system is able to detect together and simultaneously different sounds and properties of 
sounds, and so the brain seems to processes several distinct properties of sounds at 
once.  Also, QST would allow us to map pitch, timbre, and loudness in a 
multidimensional space.  However, for simplicity’s sake, I only examine audible 
properties and corresponding mental qualities individually.   
In support of this suggestion, let us first explore the rates of sound vibration; in 
scientific terminology: frequencies, which are measured in cycles per second called 
Hertz (Hz), or what I call ‘pitchesp’.   
The total range of frequencies that unimpaired ears detect goes from 16 Hz to 
20,000 Hz; this range varies according to age and other factors.  Interestingly, 
musicians themselves almost never use the total range of frequencies—like that which 
we hear in the sliding scale of a siren, for instance, when it starts low and goes higher 
and higher until it is out of earshot.  Instead, musicians use a limited number of fixed 
pitches that extend from ca. 20 Hz to ca. 5,000 Hz.  These pitches are calibrated 
scientifically, with European-styled orchestras tuning to a pitch with a frequency of 440 
cycles per second which they label ‘A’ and then assemble into a scale (Kerman, 2008).  
The difference, or distance, between any two pitches in such scales is called an interval; 
given its peculiar character, the most important interval is the octave (Randel, 1986). 
If this is correct, QST, then, can describe a pitchp with respect to how among an 
array of them we discriminate.  We can sense the pitchp of an individual note that fixes 
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 I borrow the initial conception of sounds considered as events from Casati and Dokic (1994), and 
O’Callaghan (2007; 2009).  A feature of these views is that sound events have distal locations—i.e., occur 
in or near their sources. I don’t address the problems of sound’s apparent spatiality, ‘pure event’ nor 
appreciating music independently from its sources, see Scruton (1997), Hamilton (2009).   
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its position in the scale depending on how high the note is in respect to another—e.g. 
one pitchp is relatively low at 440 Hz, while it is an octave higher at 880, and it is higher 
still at 1320 Hz.  Evidently, we do not need to know the specific hertz in order to sense 
those distinctions. 
The distance between any two pitchesp in a quality-space depends on how many 
similar qualities of pitchm we are able to discern.  For example, we can discriminate 
among a variety of pitchesm that range from low to increased frequency, such as from 
440 Hz, then passing through 880, 1320, 1760, 2200, and so forth at multiples of the 
fundamental frequency13 until finally on to 5280 Hz, as shown on the x-axis of the figure 
below.  
 
 
Figure 1, I borrowed two diagrams of Lotto & Holt (2010) and made them converge in order to 
illustrate a range of discriminable similarities and differences among qualities of two different 
woodwinds—spectra for a flute and clarinet playing the same note (ceteris paribus). We can 
capture how fast the frequency is repeated, how extensive the wave for the same frequency is, 
and how the amplitude (timbre) is different depending on the instrument played. We can compare 
the qualities of each with considerable precision. 
 
Next, how would quality-space map characteristic tones captured by timbre—
also called tone-color, or the quality of sound that distinguishes one instrument or voice 
from another?  Given a certain pitch and loudness, sounds differ depending on the 
instruments and voices that generate them.  When two instruments play the same note 
or pitch, we can discern the quality-space between them; for example, between a 
clarinet-like sound and a flute-like sound (Figure 1). 
Differences in timbre like these are clearly heard before a typical concert begins.  
In order to tune, the oboe plays an ‘A’ and all the instruments follow by playing the same 
note.  However, even though each instrument plays the same note, we can still hear 
differences in the timbres of every instrument or sometimes by group: strings, 
woodwinds, brass, and percussion.  Even people who do not know the names of the 
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 The fundamental frequency is ‘the lowest frequency or tone in the harmonic series and hence the first 
harmonic, i.e. the frequency of which all remaining frequencies in the series are integral multiples’ 
(Randel, 1986: 330). 
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instruments can distinguish between a smooth, rich sound, like that of the violin, and the 
hollow, brassy, bright sound of a trumpet.  Thus, although some sounds are similar, we 
are able to sense, say, the timbrep of a flute and the timbrep of a clarinet; the mental 
quality of each timbre—i.e. timbrem—enables us to make that discrimination. 
The specification of frequencies and relative amplitudes are easy to sense and 
measure when a particular instrument is played.  However, this is by no means the only 
clue used to identify instrumental sounds.  Timbrep has a peculiar character sometimes 
difficult to discern—i.e., the characteristic sound results, largely, though not exclusively, 
from the relative intensities or strengths of the partials or overtones.14 
Kerman (2008: 4) observes ‘[p]iano strings… vibrate not only along their total 
length, but also simultaneously in half-lengths, quarters, eights, and so on. …The 
amplitudes of these fractional vibrations, called partials… [or] overtones…, are much 
lower than the amplitude of the main vibration. Indeed overtones are not heard as new 
pitches, but as part of the string’s basic or fundamental pitch. The amount and 
proportion of overtones are what give a sound its characteristic tone-color’ or timbre.  
When timbresp are identified by their location in a quality-space—that is, relative 
to timbresm—this audible property contains in itself overtonesp in an intimate relation 
with the fundamental pitchp, and also loudnessp. That is, by sensing timbrep our auditory 
quality-space can map timbrem as a singular event from which we could discriminate, 
albeit with difficulty, its overtonesm,—e.g. an octave, low and high pitchesm, and a 
certain loudnessm. 
In other words, the property of timbre is intrinsically a simultaneity of sounds 
together—say, a timbrep with its respective pitchp or frequency, and occurring at a 
certain loudnessp or with a specific amplitude distinct of the main.  If we were able to 
discern among overtonesp without any difficulty, the quality-space we construct of them 
would be that in which we could experience overtonesm discerning and capturing the 
distance between octaves, the differences of its particular or its respective pitchesm, and 
its corresponding changes of loudnessm independently of the main amplitude and of the 
fundamental pitchp.  
It is important to clarify that the physical property of timbre involves several 
amplitudes, one for each octave. If we consider, for example, “each” amplitude in an 
independent way, this would be an element of a one-dimensional space.  But the 
timbrep itself is an element of a multidimensional space because it combines all those 
amplitudes and frequencies.  Since we can distinguish among timbresm and presumably 
not in terms of the frequenciesp and amplitudesp that constitute each timbrep, it may 
indeed make sense to group the frequencies together and regard each distinguishable 
timbrem as a single event describable by location in a multidimensional space.  
Finally, our quality-space can also classify the intensity of energy or level of 
strength of sound vibrations—which in scientific terminology is called amplitude, and it is 
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 Overtone is ‘a secondary vibration in a sound-producing body, which contributes to the tone-color [or 
timbre]: also called partial’ (Kerman, 2008: 431).  We identify it when running up the white keys on the 
piano, where a series of successive pitches is sounded; it seems as if the pitch “duplicates” an earlier 
pitch, but a higher level. This new pitch doesn’t sound identical to the old one, but somehow the two 
sounds are very similar. They blend extremely well; they almost seem to melt into each other. When 
strings vibrate to produce sound they vibrate in partials or overtones; that is, not only along their full 
length but also in halves and other fractions. A vibrating string that is half as long as another will reinforce 
the latter’s strongest partial. This reinforcement causes the duplication effect of octaves. 
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measured in decibels—, or what I call loudnessp and the class of gradations and 
changes in loudnessp.  I here use ‘dynamics,’ as musicians do, to refer to the level of 
sound, or amplitude of sounds and gradation of loudness.   
Our quality-space likewise map dynamicsm and fine-grained gradations in 
dynamicsm that go from pianissimo or very soft—passing through piano, mezzo piano, 
mezzo forte, and forte—, to fortissimo or very loud.  Notice that it can also map changes 
in dynamicsm which can be sudden—or subito—or gradual as in a crescendo or 
diminuendo—i.e., gradually getting louder, and gradually getting softer. Moreover, 
aspects of execution such as staccato or legato—i.e., a note of shortened duration or 
notes tied together. 
Dynamicsm, or the perceived intensity of a sound vibration, depends upon the 
sound pressure, the frequency and duration of the sound, the absorption and the 
reflection of the sound by the air and surrounding objects, and the distance between the 
listener and the sound source (O'Callaghan and Nudds, 2009). 
We have been able to individuate fine-grained auditory mental qualities 
(pitchesm, timbresm, and loudnessm) by their location in the relevant quality-space we 
create.  I demonstrate this view in action by commenting on a musical fragment (at §3). 
As we will see, an auditory state is conscious when we are aware of being in that 
particular state with its distinctive auditory mental qualities.15  
 
 
2.1. Auditory Quality-Space for Sound Location  
 
One might ask whether QST would allow us to identify sounds as spatially 
located, and thus whether we could map the location of sounds by distance and 
direction.  We have seen that auditory mental qualities are the properties of auditory 
sensations in virtue of which we are able to discern among a range of audible properties 
of sounds.  We have also seen that QST allows us to map similarities and differences, 
and, derivatively from that mapping, their corresponding auditory mental qualities.  In 
this section, I claim that we are able to individuate auditory mental qualities relative to 
their spatial locations by their particular position in the relevant quality-space we create.  
My proposal not only explains the way we discriminate among auditory spatial locations 
(hereafter ‘sound locations’) and the way this feature works in an quality-space, but also 
expands QST itself to auditory location. 
Two preliminary clarifications are necessary here:  
(A) It is important in this context not to confuse ‘position’ with ‘location.’  
‘Position,’ according to the QST, does not refer to the location of physical properties or 
characteristics, the way sounds are located in physical space or the way they emerge 
from different directions.  To the contrary: ‘position’ here refers only to the properties 
with respect to the way we distinguish among them.   
(B) It is important not to confuse (i) ‘space’ as that being used to indicate the 
(mental) quality-space that we built of auditory properties based on their differences or 
the distances between them—that is, in virtue of getting their corresponding mental 
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 Remember that there is a distinction between an auditory state with an auditory mental quality being 
conscious and a state without it—since mental qualities can also occur without appearing in the subject’s 
stream of consciousness. 
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qualities—and (ii) ‘space’ as that being used by philosophers of sound and auditory 
perception to designate sounds as located in the (physical) space or to describe our 
spatial hearing ability.  Sounds conceived of as events can be located either where their 
material sources are (distal), where the listener is (proximal) or somewhere in the 
intervening space between the listener and the resonating object (medial).16   
For simplicity’s sake, I will write the physical property of the sound location as 
‘sound locationp’, and the perceived characteristic or its related mental quality as ‘sound 
locationm’.  But how does quality-space could allow us to classify the audible aspect or 
property of an event intrinsically related to its sound source—what I call sound 
locationp? 
First, auditory scientists and acousticians believe that the auditory system allows 
us to orientate ourselves and to discern the location of sound sources with certain 
precision by making use of several cues.  These cues include the estimation of distance 
and velocity, the intensity, timing measurement, reflection, direction, and spectral 
information of sounds (Blauert, 1997; Schnupp, Nelken, and King, 2012).17   
Even as we individuate properties of auditory events as being located in the 
physical space—i.e. sound locationsp—, we discriminate simultaneously among other 
properties of those events as well.  That is, when a particular sound is produced by a 
certain source, we are able to estimate the distance from it to its source by sensing 
other properties, such as the loudness and the sound spectrum—e.g. distant sound 
sources have softer loudness or deaden sounds than closer sources; high-frequencies 
are more rapidly absorbed by the air than low-frequencies.  
Other factors may contribute to locate the sound source with certain accuracy:  
head movement can improve the accuracy of location stereo hearing.  When the source 
is directly located in front or behind the listener, accuracy varies 1o or less; but if the 
source is located to her left or right, it’s around 15o (Pitt, 2010).   
We are also able to estimate other characteristics of sounds thanks to the 
source’s movement or the listener’s movement.  For example, when the listener moves 
from side-to-side between two static sounds sources, the auditory events in the distance 
appear “to move” slower than those close to the listener.  The number of sound 
sources, voices or instruments playing the same note or different notes simultaneously 
may also influence the way we detect sound events; if two separate speakers play 
different notes we are able to distinguish the two sounds.  If they produce the same 
note, it is typical that we hear a single sound.  Yet if a single speaker produces different 
notes simultaneously, we typically hear two distinct sounds (Blauert, 1997; O’Callaghan, 
2008).  
Aurally experiencing different sounds as being located in a spatial field is given 
as a function of their different physical spatial locations—i.e. where the locations of their 
sound sources are—, and in how the listener is able to make the corresponding 
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 In agreement with Casati and Dokic (2009: 109–10), O’Callaghan (2009: 28), and consistent with our 
phenomenology, distal theories seem to be correct.  However, two distal views are at stake: the relational 
event theory, which claims that sounds are events involving both the source and the surrounding medium 
(O'Callaghan), and the located event theory, which claims that sounds are located at their sources—i.e., 
since sounds supervene on the physical processes in them, sounds are monadic events happening to 
material objects (Casati and Dokic).  For reasons of space I omit discussion on these theories. 
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 For the neural processing that underlies spatial hearing see Schnupp et.al. (2012). 
11 
 
distinctions in terms of distance and direction.  In order to make those distinctions, the 
listener can move her head, focus on loudness, and compare the properties of the 
auditory events according to their “position” in the relevant quality-space that she builds.   
In other words, we can sense sound locationsp relative to their “location” in the 
physical space depending on their noticeable distances (how far apart sound sources 
are) and on their input directions (vertical, horizontal, central, or lateral).  We can then 
discern sound locationsm with respect to what among an array of sound locationsp we 
are able to discriminate.   
In terms of directions, we are able to sense vertical and horizontal sound 
locationsp, or lateral and central sound locationsp, and the mental qualities of each one 
enables us to make the corresponding discriminations.  So our quality-space can map 
those aurally perceived properties—sound locationsm—as going from above to below 
(or the reverse), from the right to the left (or the reverse), from the front to the back (or 
the reverse), from side-to-side diagonally, in rotations, etc. —and can thereby discern 
among those differences.   
In terms of distance or spatial arrangement (how “close to” or “far away from” 
their sources auditory events are), our quality-space can also map the perceived 
characteristics or their related mental qualities.  To put it in simple terms, the position or 
difference between any two sounds locationsp in a quality-space depends on what 
different qualities of sounds locationsm we are able to discern —e.g. whether one is 
close or far.  Notice that singling out and referring to a specific location by a 
demonstrative (that sound…, those sounds…), may suffice when we listen to a sound 
coming from a particular distance or direction and attend to the sensation that results 
from it.   
The relevant point is that since we are able to sense sound locationsp, the 
quality-space that we construct is that in which we can experience sound locationsm 
depending on a set of sound’s properties and cues.  To illustrate: let us allude to 
Karlheinz Stockhausen’s Oktophonie and concentrate only on a few details of the 
electronic accompaniment to explain how QST may account for sounds locationsm 
(relative to directions) of our experience as derived from the sounds spatially located.  
Briefly, Oktophonie is structurally developed from a serially-derived technique 
that comprises projection, expansion, and multiplication of sounds.  Properties such as 
pitches, timbres (which are created electronically), and dynamics are succinctly joined 
to the melodic succession which defines both the small and large-scale architecture of 
the piece.  In general terms, it is constituted as a cube in an auditorium of eight 
loudspeakers or sound layers (I-VIII) located in each vertex, with four loudspeakers 
placed at the same level as the seated audience, and another four loudspeakers placed 
about 14 meters overhead (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2, Consider that the console is placed in the centre of the auditorium, where the sound 
projectionist manually controls many of the spatial auditory events, and the audience seats around it. 
 
The specific location of the loudspeakers, together with an array of different 
synthesizers, mixing consoles, and samplers, produces the peculiar effect of being in a 
360° sound field, giving the impression of total motion.  Oktophonie creates and 
develops four sound patterns or timbres resembling what we might term crashes, 
bombs, shots, and text-sounds, then combines them all together in some fashion.  The 
sound patterns occur or “move” from vertex or take-off point simultaneously at different 
speeds in all sorts of directions: diagonally, from front to back, from side-to-side and 
from up-to-down, and rotationally in spirals to the right and to the left, with downward 
rotations from above to below—the alternating tempi gradually getting faster or slower, 
either accelerando or ritardando.   
Each sound arrives at a different vertex or landing point among the loudspeakers 
or “moves” downwards or upwards corresponding to the initial sounds or glissando 
sounds—the sliding from one note to another.  In a nutshell, sounds occur or “come 
from” all directions and rotate around the loudspeakers (I-VIII) with exceptional 
flexibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3, The sound patterns expand into the counterpoint in a three-dimensional soundscape. The 
cube’s organization allows sound “moving” from point to point--different arrows show how sounds “move” 
within this space. 
 
The complexity of Oktophonie’s architecture seems to multiply on itself because 
of the effect of eight separate loudspeakers playing four different timbres combined and 
varied at different loudness.  We are able to distinguish, however, these eight 
loudspeakers in each vertex (I-VIII) and within them aurally discern the four distinct 
timbres—the crash, bomb, shot, and text sounds—in at least some of their basic 
combinations.  Moreover, we are able to aurally detect other properties and cues and to 
V
   
I   
II   
VIII  
VI 
IV   
VII   
III   
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estimate the distances among the sources simultaneously.  Our auditory quality-space 
is multidimensional; it can map all these elements together.  How does quality-space 
map mere sound locationsp relative to directions in our experience of Oktophonie?  
When loudspeakers V-VI-VII-VIII produce and encompass the different timbres at 
different speeds in diagonal directions, from front to back, horizontally and vertically, 
and in a spiral rotation from left to right (Figure 3), quality-space allows us to discern 
these distinct sound locationsp and derivatively from that process, mapping their 
corresponding sound locationsm.  That is, one occurring from side-to-side (for example, 
maybe the crash-like sound produced by loudspeaker V and landing at loudspeaker 
VIII), another occurring from front to back (perhaps the bomb-like sound produced by 
loudspeaker V and landing at VI), another occurring in diagonal (the shot-like sound 
produced by loudspeaker VI and landing at loudspeaker VIII), etc.  
The sound locationsm are thus individuated by their position in a quality-space 
that we create relative to their sound locationsp.  Although an array of other audible 
properties are involved in an intimate relation with the identification of sound locationsp, 
we have paid attention to mere sound locationsp, so our auditory quality-space maps 
sound locationsm from which we could describe our auditory experience.  
 
 
3. Consciousness of Auditory Sensations and Conscious Thoughts 
 
As mentioned (§1), when qualitative states are conscious one is conscious of 
being in those states by having thoughts—higher-order-states.  As noted (§2), my view 
of an auditory quality-space captures the way in which we are able to discriminate 
among pitchesm, timbresm, loudnessm, and sound locationsm.  HOT theory, then, as it 
applies to qualitative mental states as against purely intentional states, depends on 
QST in order to describe our states in terms of corresponding mental qualities.  That is, 
our higher-order-thoughts could capture qualitative distinctions of our having a particular 
auditory sensation exhibiting pitchm, timbrem, loudnessm, and sound locationsm.
  
HOT theory explains that a way in which we are conscious of our sensations may 
depend on attention and experience at discerning various mental qualities. The way of 
being aware of our states as being of different types can result from acquiring 
conceptual resources for the qualities of our sensations.  In this section, I analyze how 
acquiring musical experience and conceptual resources for the qualities of our auditory 
sensations might affect the way we are conscious of those sensations with fine-grained 
mental qualities.    
 
 
3.1. Experience and Conceptual Resources  
  
According to Rosenthal (2005: 186–7), ‘increased attention to one’s sensation 
seems by itself dramatically to enhance the way one is conscious of the qualities of the 
sensation’; furthermore, ‘repeated experience is also sometimes responsible for one’s 
sensations coming to seem to have more refined qualities’. 
Let me elaborate: by paying attention more closely we can distinguish musical 
sound from incidental noise occurring at the same time.  Depending on the amount of 
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repetition, constancy, and time spent in listening, our sensations can also seem to have 
more refined qualities: Ceteris paribus, the experience would not be the same for a 
hearer who attentively listens to Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony twice a week for a year 
and for one who listens to it twice in a year.  Both of them can achieve a certain 
awareness of their particular states with specific qualities, but they would be doing this 
in relatively differently refined ways.  Every time one listens to a piece of music one 
could find different features of the whole work; with repeated experience, one‘s ear 
becomes more acute and sophisticated, and thus one could be aware of one‘s auditory 
sensations to a more complex degree (Renero, 2009).   
Other repeated experiences and attention can also be relevant for our 
consciousness of the qualities of the sensation.  We might be able to anticipate what 
would be played next, or recognize similarities and differences between parts of a piece 
or between different works (Davies, 1994: 326–31), or even distinct interpretations of 
the same piece.  
One might question whether repeated experience and attention or much 
exposition could not impair fruition, and not only boost.  To remain with the Bruckner 
symphony example: could not attention decrease dramatically after dozens of listening 
to it? Could not a decrement of attention imply a decrement of higher-order-thoughts?   
First, my example is premised on a hypothetical listener who actually listens to 
music with interest.  She is interested enough to listen to it repeatedly in order to learn 
something new every time that she hears to Bruckner’s symphony.  So every time she 
listens to this piece of music she can find different features—e.g., the listener can 
identify the accompaniment of tremolando strings in the scherzo, or the pulsating string 
chords in D flat over which violins have an expressive hymn-like theme in the adagio.  
Alternatively, at some subsequent time, she can notice the themes to which a 
movement returns, or the repetition of a phrase, as well as apprehend the theme's 
articulation, and so on. 
Second, attention may be considered a necessary condition in order to gain 
access to aspects of her experience or to strength the way she has certain experiences.  
Also, since the listener is interested in the work, she pays attention on it.  Certainly, 
once the listener loses interest in the work, her attention may decrease, and so the way 
she experiences the work in question.  Whether a decrement of attention implies a 
decrement of higher-order-thoughts or not is a matter of a different discussion that I do 
not tackle here.  
Now, let us see how acquiring conceptual resources for the qualities of auditory 
sensations can affect our consciousness of those states and the conscious thoughts we 
have about our musical experiences.  
 Although one could have higher-order-thoughts about qualitative character 
without language, within the HOT theory, acquiring conceptual resources for the 
qualities of one’s sensations affects the way one is conscious of those sensations with 
distinctive qualities. This means that learning new words, their meanings and use, could 
result in new conscious qualities.  ‘One may not be conscious of any differences 
between the auditory sensations that result from hearing oboes and clarinets until one 
learns words for the different qualities. Learning those terms will then sometimes lead to 
one’s being conscious of the sensory qualities as being of distinct types’ (Rosenthal, 
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2005: 187). Again, Rosenthal does not elaborate on auditory experience; let us analyze 
it here. 
Notice that possessing more language does not necessarily imply more capacity 
to discriminate: a demonstrative or observer may suffice, I think (as in mere sound 
location: “that sound…, those sounds…”).  In order to have an experience with certain 
contents, the subject does not need to possess the corresponding conceptual capacity.  
Concept acquisition, however, may make an important difference in the subjective 
experience, and how things seem to us could ground the demonstrative reference in a 
distinctive (and specifically) recognized mental quality.   
What is relevant is that, insofar as one acquires new language, presumably ‘a 
subjective difference emerges between mental qualities that had previously been 
subjectively indistinguishable’ (Rosenthal, 2004: 39; cf. 1997: 742).   
But what is that difference?  As I show (§3.2) the difference is in having thoughts 
with new contents; concretely, to have higher-order-thoughts that one is in an auditory 
state exhibiting certain auditory mental qualities.  Thus, learning new words such as 
‘oboe’ and ‘clarinet’ for the qualities of one’s auditory sensations can result in our having 
higher-order-thoughts that are more fine-grained with respect to distinctions among 
various mental qualities.   
Let me suggest that the subject would learn the specific words for those 
qualities—mellow tones—and their sound sources—oboe and clarinet—, so she could 
also distinguish the source from the sound.  So, concepts help us to individuate, to 
easily focus on something in particular, and to enhance our experiences.   
If we again consider pitchm, timbrem, and loudnessm, it would seem that learning 
a word such as ‘timbre’ for that character of sound we recognize as generated by an 
oboe versus a clarinet could make us aware of being in an auditory sensation with that 
distinctive quality.  Once we acquire a refined vocabulary, we might become able to 
differentiate fine-grain mental qualities, and to discern consciously among them and our 
auditory states.  By learning and using these words to label different mental qualities, 
then, we would be able to distinguish states with new qualities.  Accordingly, our being 
able to have these qualities is not the result of a characteristic of the mental qualities 
themselves but rather of how our higher-order-thoughts describe that state in qualitative 
terms.  I will go on now to show how this works in our musical experience.  
 
 
3.2. Conscious Thoughts about One’s Musical Experience  
 
Auditory quality-space posits mental qualities corresponding to discernible 
audible properties.  However, with refined vocabulary and, especially, with experience, 
we could consciously discern among our auditory states that exhibit those qualities, and 
presumably come to have higher-order-thoughts that describe our auditory sensations 
in terms of the corresponding mental qualities.  I conclude by demonstrating this view in 
action by commenting on a couple of musical fragments, and showing how a 
hypothetical listener could describe and report her thoughts in qualitative terms.  We will 
see that describing things in auditory terms, plus the experience gained over time of 
discerning various auditory mental qualities, consists in having thoughts that organize 
the auditory experience.  
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Consider a person who has acquired the experience and concepts to discern 
timbresm and sound locationsm.  This person has the ability to point out when some of 
those qualities are present in her experience.  In auditory sensing a fragment of 
Stockhausen’s Oktophonie, the listener may describe back timbresm and sound 
locationsm like this:  
“Low rumbles, electrifying clashes, collisions, and crystal-like sounds explode 
simultaneously at the beginning. Then clearly distinguishing bomb-like and shot-like 
sounds appear from side-to-side.  After that, bombs come from the lower loudspeakers 
whereas the shots come from the upper loudspeakers, and relatively slow changes to 
other timbres. Suddenly, these changes acquire a more noticeable character moving 
forward and onward with considerably energy.  A bit later, a repeated and rapid sound 
succession paves its way through a horizontally moving spiral. It speeds up and slows 
down in both opposite ways”. 
The listener here is describing the qualitative character of some timbresm in 
sound locationsm comparatively in respect to directions or how different one sound 
locationm is to another in quality-space.  
Now, consider that this person has acquired the concepts of ‘pitch’, ‘dynamics’, 
and of their corresponding patterns of change.  She discerns differences amongst 
dynamicsm and the changes that go from loud to soft, and discerns pitchesm from high 
to low within a passage, which she then applies in her descriptions of the qualities of her 
states.  Although she has already aurally sensed and individuated the audible 
properties, by means of her higher-order-thoughts she can also be aware of being in 
those qualitative states with their distinctive dynamicsm and pitchesm.  I will demonstrate 
how this might work by commenting on a fragment (Allegro Moderato) of Franz 
Schubert’s 8th Symphony in B Minor, D.759. The listener describes her auditory 
sensations in terms of mental qualities:  
0’04”: Quiet and mysterious opening with low pitch (say, below other heard 
pitches), and very soft dynamics or pianissimo. 0’20”: A middle range pitch. 0’28”: A 
high pitch starts. 0’36”: Sudden loud dynamic or subito forte. 0’52”: The sound gets 
louder, a higher pitch is identified, and another change in dynamics: a long crescendo 
leading to forte, then fortissimo. 1’11”: A sudden collapse of soft dynamics or piano 
followed by diminuendo. 1’21”: A new tone, first low pitch, and then high pitch with 
marked pianissimo. 2’03”: Finally, fortissimo again (Kerman, 2008: 9).18 
Notice that the listener describes the qualitative character of the dynamics as 
well as the pitches themselves.  In particular, she describes the dynamicsm 
comparatively in respect to the relative graduation or how close one dynamic is to 
another dynamicm in quality-space. Yet it is possible that the listener is describing 
changes in the dynamicsm as in 0’52”, and pitchesm within a range, and in respect to the 
antecedent in the temporal succession.  The description of her auditory states consists 
in her having thoughts that organize her auditory experience of this passage.   
Notice that auditory experience indeed exists in time: is temporally extended and 
has duration.  When the listener hears this fragment, her auditory experience occurs in 
time—or at the most a few moments later.  The listener is able to automatically 
incorporate changes, succession, and persistence.  Conscious auditory states seem to 
occur in the same temporal framework as the auditory events happen, even though their 
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exact timing is not easy to determine.  In the previous example, I have marked time to 
represent the progression of the passage, and to show that in order for one’s auditory 
sensations to be conscious, it is necessary they be conscious in respect of a relative 
time sequence with duration (this point will apply to the next example as well). 
Now, the listener’s experience of this piece would be enhanced if, during the 
hearing, she were to focus more on concepts and perhaps on technicalities.  By 
‘experience’ I mean the combination which results from our auditory states and those 
higher-order-thoughts whose contents are those states with fine-grained dynamicsm and 
pitchesm.  By ‘enhanced’, I refer to the experience’s being a richer variety of mental 
qualities, a way in which the listener’s conscious thoughts might arise.  In this sense, 
ceteris paribus, a hearer who identifies the various dynamicsm and pitchesm in 
Schubert’s 8th Symphony would not be having the same experience as a hearer who 
hardly distinguishes between them.  
Next, let me now return to Schubert’s 8th Symphony and comment on 
approximately the same passage as heard by an experienced listener who has acquired 
a refined vocabulary for certain qualities, and can discriminate timbresm.  She will be 
attentively listening to the passage and experiencing the music’s flow with the timbrem 
as it changes over a period of two minutes, with the theme changing suddenly when it is 
played by different instruments.  She will be having higher-order-thoughts that assert 
that she is in a state with these particular qualities.  Since she has already acquired a 
refined language, these differences will be reflected in the intentional content of her 
thoughts, which are themselves consequently refined.  
She might just express: “I hear x timbrem.”  However, I want to show that she 
would also be able to report the sensations she is having with distinctive timbresm. 
Notice that a listener’s own reporting is an important way to be aware of her own current 
or recently past auditory experience.   
Interestingly, the listener’s reports provide evidence concerning her thoughts 
about how the musical experience appears to her: “At 0’04” I think19 I hear some 
rustling-like double-basses sound opening the first movement. At 0’20” violins enter, 
and at 0’28” some woodwinds are incorporated into the strings. I think I hear clarinet-like 
mellow tones, while I barely hear a horn-like hollow sound. At 0’52” massed strings—
like bright and shrill sounds—arise. I think that especially the violins sound powerful and 
intense; the sound of the cellos is gorgeous. At 1’11” a horns-like brassy sound is 
ringing, and a sudden collapse to smooth textures is being carried by strings again. I am 
not sure if there is a clarinet or a bassoon accompanying the strings. At 1’21” all the 
strings plays together; some of them seem to be trembling. I think I hear a cello-like 
plaintive sound and violin-like mellow sound. I hear undistinguishable woodwinds in the 
background. Finally, at 2’03” I hear a sharp cut off and then a sonic boom. I hear many 
instruments are playing together; they are hard to distinguish.”  
What is relevant here is that the listener is conscious of being in these different 
auditory states as they change sequentially.  I have attempted to mark the time as a 
representation of reportability: the listener is able to report her thoughts or cluster of 
thoughts while she is conscious of the differences in her states with their respective 
mental qualities. 
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so fine-grained in describing qualitative states. 
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Finally, HOT theory and QST in tandem can provide a potential experimental 
study to be developed.  In the short term, I aim at giving an account of real time 
subjective auditory experience that could use reports and in turn illustrate some 
properties of our auditory experiences in connection to brain activity.  Such an account 
could broaden the significance of the subjective experience by combining theoretical 
resources on consciousness and experimental results. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In searching for an answer to the question of how our consciousness of auditory 
states arises, I have claimed that the rich and varied features of our auditory experience 
—specifically with regards to pitch, timbre, loudness, and spatial location—can be 
organized by our conscious thoughts, and all these make an important difference not 
only for our subjective auditory experiences per se, but also for what we process while 
thinking about those very experiences. 
Using HOT and QS theories in tandem, and extending them to the auditory 
modality, I have shown that we can discern important differences among auditory 
mental qualities.  I have further shown how experience and acquisition of conceptual 
resources can contribute to our being aware of the differences among our conscious 
auditory states.  Finally, I have shown that our consciousness of auditory states consists 
in having thoughts that organize our experience of a musical passage.  
HOT and QST gain further plausibility from their applicability to this domain, but 
my goal here is not simply to bolster these theories, but also to advance some specific 
proposals about auditory experience, which may prove useful to researchers with a 
range of theoretical orientations.20  
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